CONCLUSIONS – THE QUESTIONS ANSWERED AND THE LESSONS TO BE LEARNED

1. In these Conclusions I answer the questions arising from my terms of reference and set out the lessons to be learned from the evidence uncovered by the Review. The questions I will answer are:

   • Did Savile commit acts of inappropriate sexual conduct in connection with his work for the BBC?

   • Were any concerns raised within the BBC whether formally or informally about Savile’s inappropriate sexual conduct?

   • To what extent were BBC personnel aware of inappropriate sexual conduct by Savile in connection with his work for the BBC?

   • To what extent ought BBC personnel to have been aware of inappropriate sexual conduct by Savile in connection with his work for the BBC?

   • Did the culture and practices within the BBC during the years of Savile’s employment enable inappropriate sexual conduct to continue unchecked?

As required by my terms of reference, I also take account, as necessary, of the findings of Dame Linda Dobbs in her investigation into the activities of Stuart Hall.

*Did Savile commit acts of inappropriate sexual conduct in connection with his work for the BBC?*

2. I consider this question in detail in Chapter 5. I conclude that Savile committed many acts of inappropriate sexual conduct in connection with his work for the BBC. The Summary describes the varied nature of this conduct and Savile’s modus operandi. Savile abused
boys, girls and women, usually young women. His preferred target seems to have been teenage girls.

3. Most, but not all, of the more serious incidents of rape and attempted rape and some of the more serious sexual assaults I have described took place on Savile’s own premises and not at the BBC. They were, however, connected with Savile’s work for the BBC. Usually, Savile either met the victim at the BBC or else he groomed the victim by offering the opportunity to attend the BBC before taking the victim elsewhere, often to his home or camper-van. In addition to these incidents which occurred on his own premises, Savile would gratify himself sexually on BBC premises whenever the opportunity arose and I heard of incidents which took place in virtually every one of the BBC’s premises at which he worked. These included the BBC Theatre at Shepherd’s Bush (in connection with *Jim’ll Fix It* and *Clunk Click*), Television Centre (in particular in connection with *Top of the Pops*), Broadcasting House or Egton House (where he worked in connection with BBC Radio 1), Lime Grove Studios and various provincial studios, including Leeds, Manchester and Glasgow.

*Were any concerns raised within the BBC whether formally or informally about Savile's inappropriate sexual conduct?*

4. The short answer to this question is that some complaints were made and some concerns raised, although not many considering how many incidents of abuse occurred. I need to consider who made them and to whom.

5. My first conclusion is that no complaints were made about Savile to the BBC’s Duty Office. A complaint to the Duty Office was the standard procedure for a complaint from outside the BBC. Such complaints would have been recorded in a log. However, there were eight occasions on which complaints about Savile’s sexual conduct were made in other ways. Five of those were made by or
on behalf of members of BBC staff; the remaining three were made by people outside the BBC.

6. Chronologically, the first complaint was made by C2, a telephone operator in Manchester, in the late 1960s (see paragraphs 5.56 and 5.349 of my Report). She asked Savile for his autograph; he said “give me a kiss” and pointed to his cheek but he kissed her full on the lips. C2 told her supervisor what had happened although she did not expect her supervisor to do anything about it. Given what had happened and the way in which the report was made, I do not criticise the supervisor for taking no action.

7. The second complaint was made by C13 (see paragraphs 5.61 and 5.350 of my Report). In 1969, Savile sexually assaulted C13 by grabbing her breasts with both hands; he was then rude to her. She told her immediate managers (who were both men and women). The reaction of one of her managers was to show no surprise and to suggest that it would have been more surprising if Savile had not tried to touch her. That was an inappropriate reaction but one which is not surprising given the culture of the times.

8. The third complaint was made by A6, a sound engineer who, at some time in the mid-1970s was responsible for a young trainee (see paragraphs 5.169 and 5.351 of my Report). One day, the trainee went into Savile’s dressing room to fit his microphone. On his return, the trainee was upset, saying to A6 that he was “never going in there again”. The trainee was reluctant to speak about the incident but A6 gathered that Savile had asked the trainee to fit the microphone whilst they were both on a bed and had appeared to want to fondle the trainee. A6 made a report to the sound supervisor and then to the sound manager (the next level up the management line). A6 heard nothing more and the reports seemed to have fizzled out. The reason for this is unclear. The evidence
suggests that, if the trainee was approached, he would probably have refused to speak about the incident.

9. The fourth complaint was made in the mid-1980s by B13, a studio manager (see paragraphs 5.231 and 5.352 of my Report). Savile came into the studio to record a programme and immediately asked B13 whether she was “the woman that I saw last night with the snake between her legs”. She reported the incident to her manager and a colleague of hers reported the incident to his line manager and to a woman in the personnel department. It appears that the complaint was listened to but no action was taken. I do not find that surprising as I think that conduct such as this was not generally regarded as seriously in the mid-1980s as it is today.

10. The fifth complaint was made by C51 (see paragraphs 5.254-5.255 and 5.353 of my Report) who worked as a junior employee at Television Centre. She was sexually assaulted by Savile in late 1988/early 1989. He put his hand inside her skirt up her leg. Savile left when C51’s supervisor (who was also a relatively junior employee) returned to the table with cups of coffee. C51 told her supervisor what had happened but was told to “keep your mouth shut, he is a VIP”. The supervisor did not appear to be shocked by what Savile had done but simply told C51 to keep quiet, which she did.

11. Pausing there, in none of those five incidents did the complaint result in any formal investigation. Nowadays, one would expect that each of those reported incidents would be treated with a proper degree of concern. It appears to me that the culture of the times both within and without the BBC was such that incidents of this kind were not treated seriously and, as a result, I am not surprised that none of these reports resulted in a full investigation.

12. There were three occasions when a complaint was made about Savile by a person from outside the BBC. On the first of these, C16
was assaulted by Savile at the age of 16 in September 1969. She went to Top of the Pops with a group of school friends (see paragraphs 5.62-5.65 and 5.355 of my Report). She wore hot pants and a long coat and was asked by a man with a clipboard to go onto a podium with Savile during the recording. C16 found herself very close to Savile. Suddenly, she felt his hand behind her waist, underneath the long coat. He unzipped the back of her hot pants and put his hand down inside her knickers underneath her bottom. She panicked and ran to the man with the clipboard, crying, and telling him what had happened. Another man came over to see what was going on. She was told that she must have been mistaken and, despite her protests and showing that her zip was undone, a security officer was summoned and told to escort her off the premises. She was taken out and left on the street. I have not been able to identify the floor staff involved. This was a very serious assault on a young innocent girl; it was not dealt with properly. The BBC employee who received the complaint should have reported it to his manager or to the producer of the programme. It appears to me that the BBC floor staff at that time probably regarded this kind of conduct by Savile as harmless good fun and regarded a girl who complained about it as a nuisance. I can see that it might be said that C16 could have followed this up with a formal complaint to the Duty Office, but I do not criticise her in any way because she did not.

13. The second complaint by a person from outside the BBC was made on 24 November 1976 when B8 attended Top of the Pops (see paragraphs 5.183-5.185 and 5.356 of my Report). She was asked to sit on some staging on a podium. Savile appeared beside her and started talking to the camera. She felt Savile’s hand going underneath her bottom. She was shocked and leapt in the air and, as she came down, his hand was underneath her, “fiddling” with her. She was able to move away and went to speak to a BBC employee (a man with earphones). She told him what had
happened. He told her not to worry; it was “just Jimmy Savile mucking about”. When she remonstrated, he told her to move out of the way as they were trying to move the camera. He should have reported the complaint to his manager or to the producer of the programme and recorded it in a log. It appears that he did neither and that the complaint was completely ignored. The attitude of the member of BBC staff involved suggests that he saw what Savile was doing as harmless fun and B8 as a nuisance. However, in addition, there can be little doubt, from his reaction, that the BBC employee with the earphones was prepared to believe that Savile had done what B8 had complained about.

14. The third complainant from outside the BBC is C33 (see paragraphs 5.221-5.227 and 5.357 of my Report). C33 was working as a waitress. At the time, she was 19. Ted Beston, Savile’s Radio 1 producer, was a regular customer where C33 worked and got to know her quite well. In late 1978 or early 1979, he asked C33 if she would like to meet Savile and invited her to an event which involved a drinks party which took place in a portable corporate hospitality cabin, at which other BBC personnel were present. C33 was shown into a curtained-off area in order to meet Savile. He was on a low sofa. He lunged at her and kissed her forcibly, grabbing at her breasts and putting his hands down inside her top. He took hold of her hand and put it inside his tracksuit bottoms. His penis was erect. She ran out of the curtained area and went to Mr Beston and told him what had happened. He treated her as if she was being silly and told her that she should go back in. She left the event. She saw Mr Beston after this incident, but did not feel able to refer to what had happened. She made no further complaint to anyone else at the BBC.

15. There were two further occasions when reports about Savile’s conduct were made by a person external to the BBC. I do not consider these to be complaints, rather expressions of concern. In
the mid-1970s, Ian Hampton made two reports about Savile’s behaviour. He was a musician who played bass guitar for a group called Sparks and appeared on Top of the Pops about 15 times. Mr Hampton had heard rumours in the music industry that Savile had sex with underage teenage girls. On two separate occasions, Mr Hampton saw Savile leave the Top of the Pops studio with a young girl. On the first occasion when he saw this, he told that night’s presenter (who was not Savile) what he had seen. The presenter’s response was to tell him not to be silly. We have spoken to the presenter concerned. He has no recollection of the conversation but our impression is that, at the time, the freelance presenter (whom I shall not name) genuinely thought the suggestion that Savile was taking advantage of a young girl was preposterous.

16. On the second occasion, Savile himself was presenting Top of the Pops. Mr Hampton saw him leave the studio with a young teenage girl. Savile returned not long afterwards but Mr Hampton did not see the girl again. Mr Hampton was unaware of any reaction from the BBC staff to Savile’s disappearance. However, Mr Hampton told us that the members of his band all noticed what had happened. On the second occasion, Mr Hampton spoke to Robin Nash, a producer, asking him what Savile was up to. When Mr Nash asked him what he meant and he explained what he had seen, Mr Nash told him not to be ridiculous. We have been unable to speak to Mr Nash, who died some time ago.

17. My view of both these reports is that they did not entail clearly inappropriate conduct by Savile. They were reports of unusual behaviour which might or might not have had a perfectly innocent explanation. If a person had heard rumours about Savile’s sexual interest in young girls (as Mr Hampton had), a report such as this would ring alarm bells; but if the recipient of the report had no prior reason to suspect Savile of sexual misconduct, the report would seem meaningless. As the presenter concerned thought the
suggestion that Savile was doing something wrong was preposterous, I do not think it could be said that he was aware of any inappropriate behaviour or that he was under a duty to report the matter upwards. As for Mr Nash, I have been unable to interview him. I cannot and do not conclude that he was under a duty to report what Mr Hampton had seen to any higher authority.

**To what extent were BBC personnel aware of inappropriate sexual conduct by Savile in connection with his work for the BBC?**

18. It is of great importance to the BBC to discover what its staff knew about Savile’s sexual activities and to discover at what level of seniority there was awareness of those activities. Were the Governors ever aware? Were members of the Board of Management ever aware? What about the heads of relevant departments? It is important to establish the level at which there was awareness because the press and, to a significant degree, the public have already formed the view that “the BBC” knew what Savile was doing.

19. As is apparent from the evidence I have received and which is set out in my Report, some members of BBC staff were aware of Savile’s inappropriate sexual conduct in connection with his work for the BBC. I will summarise my findings on this topic shortly. Before that, I have to decide at what level of management awareness should properly be attributed to the BBC as an institution. There is no established legal test for determining this issue.

20. In the context of the criminal law, a body corporate cannot be convicted of an offence unless an identified senior individual, who could be said to embody the company (also known as the ‘controlling mind’ of the company) could also be convicted. It seems to me that for the BBC to be convicted of a criminal offence, it would be necessary to identify (and convict) a person of the
seniority of at least the Board of Management level. However, it also seems to me that, in the context of the question I have to answer, whether the BBC as an entity was aware of Savile’s sexual deviancy, it would be wrong to assess the BBC’s awareness and responsibility by reference to so narrow a range of people. I have to make a judgment about the level of seniority at which I think it is reasonable to say that the BBC as a corporate body was aware of his conduct. I think it clearly reasonable to include members of the Board of Governors, members of the Board of Management and regular attenders at management meetings held by the Managing Directors of Radio and Television who would usually have titles such as ‘Director’ or ‘Controller’ or ‘Head’ of some central administrative function such as Publicity or Finance or Programme Services.

21. It does not appear that those responsible for the departments which made programmes usually attended such meetings. However, it does appear to me that a member of the public would be surprised to be told that, even though, say, the Head of Light Entertainment was aware of Savile’s deviancy, the BBC as a corporate entity was not aware. Although this dividing line might seem arbitrary, I think it reasonable to say that if a Head of Department was aware of Savile’s deviancy, the BBC was aware. I have also considered whether I should hold that awareness by personnel lower down the management structure should be attributed to the BBC. For example, ought awareness of a programme producer to be so attributable? Although the position of producer might sound senior, my conclusion is that, in the BBC management hierarchy, it is not. A producer would make an important contribution to a particular programme but his or her management responsibilities would be limited to that programme. Producers would be answerable to either an executive producer or a Head of Department. They would certainly be under a duty to report any concerns they had to their
line manager but, if they did not do so, it could not in my view follow that the BBC as a whole was aware of that concern.

22. Slightly more difficult is the position of an executive producer, who is senior to a producer (and is usually the line manager of a number of producers). So also, is the position of an editor, a job title which seems to be limited to news, current affairs and documentary programmes. These positions lie between that of producer and that of Head of Department and seem to me to be on the cusp of attributability. However, I have decided that I should draw the line at Head of Department. I do so because it seems to me that a Head of Department has management responsibility for an identifiable part of the BBC and also has ready access to people who would sit on one of the important management committees such as the Board of Management. I do realise that there is an element of unreality about this decision because, if a Head of Department was aware of Savile’s deviancy and deliberately decided to keep that information to himself, the BBC as a body would never have had the opportunity to do anything about the situation. However, arbitrary though it may be, I am saying that, if a Head of Department knew, the BBC, as a whole, knew.

23. I appreciate that the question of BBC knowledge is a central one for the Savile investigation (as well as the Hall investigation) and that it is an issue which attracts controversy. There are those who decided a long time ago that there was no doubt that the BBC, as a corporate entity, knew all about Savile and there are those who readily (and, frequently, publicly) make the jump from awareness (whether of rumours or more) on the part of any BBC employee or freelancer to awareness on the part of BBC senior management and, as a consequence, the BBC itself. But I approach this issue (as I must) as a judge, applying reasoned principles and reaching conclusions on the basis of the evidence I have heard and the inferences which I can properly draw.
24. In reaching my conclusions on who was aware of what, I must distinguish between, on the one hand, awareness in the sense of actual knowledge (such as would arise from observing a sexual act by Savile or by hearing an admission from Savile himself, spoken seriously and not apparently in jest) and, on the other hand, awareness arising as the result of hearing an account from someone which appeared credible (as opposed to mere gossip or rumour) or awareness arising from a realisation or an inference from circumstances. I discount mere gossip or rumour as being, of itself, incapable of giving rise to awareness of misconduct. I will discuss later what the BBC should have done about rumour and gossip.

25. In earlier sections of the Report, I have set out the incidents in which Savile did something sexually inappropriate. I do not propose to repeat that evidence here. Some of those victims were BBC employees and they certainly had actual knowledge of what had happened. Each of those victims was a fairly junior employee, so junior that their actual knowledge could not amount to awareness by the BBC.

26. Some of Savile’s victims reported what had happened to BBC staff. For example, C33, whose evidence I summarise in paragraph 14 above, reported what had happened to her to Ted Beston, who was Savile’s BBC Radio 1 producer. I deal with the evidence relating to him in some detail at paragraphs 11.61-11.89 of my Report and paragraphs 165-170 of the Summary. In addition to receiving C33’s complaint, Mr Beston did, in my view, also know that Savile would have casual sex with teenage girls (and other slightly older women) as and when he could get it. It is more difficult, however, to decide whether Mr Beston actually knew that some of the girls Savile had sex with were under the age of 16. There is some evidence that he knew, although he denies it. In the end, I concluded that I could not say that Mr Beston did know that some of the girls with whom
Savile consorted sexually were underage; he might have known. At the very least, he must have realised, from their appearance, that some of the girls might well be underage. Also, if they were in fact over 16, it would not in some cases be by a very wide margin.

27. I do not think that it ever crossed Mr Beston’s mind that he ought to discuss what he knew about Savile with his executive producer and “report” Savile upwards. However, I think he should have done. He should have been concerned about the age of some of the girls Savile consorted with and also about Savile’s conduct towards C33. Had he discussed these matters with his executive producer, it must at least be possible that steps would have been taken which would have led to Savile leaving the BBC. Instead, he kept his awareness to himself and, as a result, it cannot be said that the BBC as a corporate body was aware of what he knew.

28. Unfortunately I have not been able to identify all of the other members of BBC staff who received complaints from Savile’s victims. I have already mentioned the man with the clipboard (see paragraph 12 above) and the man with the earphones (see paragraph 13 above). They received credible and immediate reports from teenage girls who alleged that Savile had touched them sexually without their consent on the set of Top of the Pops. Regardless of their age, this was unlawful conduct and should have been reported. These men were floor staff; they were certainly not in management. They should have passed the report upwards but my conclusion is that they did not. The BBC as an institution was not aware of these matters.

29. C51’s supervisor also received a credible and immediate complaint about a sexual assault on C51. As a supervisor he should have passed the report to his manager but he did not; instead he told C51 to keep her mouth shut. Senior management did not hear of that incident.
30. I have mentioned the sound supervisor and sound manager to whom A6 spoke about his trainee’s experience (see paragraph 8 above). I do not know whether the trainee himself was prepared to make a complaint but those members of staff were certainly aware that A6 had a concern about Savile’s alleged approach to the trainee. It was clear that, if anything had happened, it was not with the trainee’s consent and would have been unlawful, even if (which is not clear) the trainee was old enough to consent. It seems to me that those members of staff ought to have reported upwards the fact that A6 had expressed concern about Savile’s actions even if the trainee had refused to make a formal complaint. It appears that this did not happen and that senior management did not become aware of this concern.

31. There are other members of staff who were aware of what was, at the very least, inappropriate sexual conduct. I have in mind, for example, C13’s supervisor (see paragraph 5.61 of my Report), who showed no surprise when told that Savile had touched her breasts and even suggested that it would have been more surprising if Savile had not tried to touch her. Of course, by the standards of today, that supervisor ought to have reported the complaint upwards and ought to have advised C13 to consider making a report to the police. Given the culture of the time, within and outside the BBC, I do not find it surprising that that incident was not reported upwards. I am quite satisfied that that report did not reach anyone in senior management.

32. Who else was aware of what Savile did and of what were they aware? In the 1970s, Canon Colin Semper (Reverend Colin Semper as he was known at the time) worked as a producer of *Speakeasy*. The evidence relating to him is covered in more detail at paragraphs 11.113 to 11.126 of my Report and paragraphs 174 to 179 of the Summary. In the early 1970s, he helped Savile to write *God’ll fix It* which was first published in 1979. Canon Semper
was promoted a number of times within the Religious Broadcasting Department but was not, at any point, Head of Department. He became Head of Religious Programmes Radio in 1979. I accept that Canon Semper did not “know” that Savile had sex with underage girls in the sense of ever seeing it happen, but he clearly did “think” that Savile had casual sex with a lot of girls, some of whom might have been underage. Canon Semper did not make any report to his managers. I have concluded that he ought to have discussed his concerns with a manager. I have explained at paragraph 21 above why I do not consider that awareness on the part of a producer should be attributed to the BBC as a corporate body. I conclude therefore that the BBC was not aware of what Canon Semper was aware. The fact that Canon Semper later became Head of Religious Programmes does not alter the position. This is for two reasons. First, Canon Semper never became a Head of Department. Second, by the time he was promoted to Head of Religious Programmes, Savile had ceased to work on Speakeasy and Canon Semper had no responsibility for him. I think it would be wrong to attribute Canon Semper’s past awareness of Savile’s conduct, never shared with anyone, to the BBC as a corporate body.

33. In 2001, Louis Theroux became aware of a credible allegation that, in the late 1960s or early 1970s, Savile had had intercourse with a 15 year old girl. It is clear that Mr Theroux’s meeting with the woman in question (who was, by then, in her 40s), had been on a strictly confidential basis and, it appears, subject to the normal journalistic convention that her confidentiality should be protected at all costs. This meant that the information could not be reported without her express permission, which was not forthcoming. Mr Theroux spoke to David Mortimer, who was at executive producer level in the BBC. Neither man thought it right to report this information either to the police or within the BBC. While the information was clearly serious, it appears that the woman in
question had approached Mr Theroux because she wanted to correct the impression given by Savile in the *When Louis Met Jimmy* documentary that he had never had a girlfriend; and Mr Theroux saw the information in that way. In the circumstances, it does not appear to me that either Mr Theroux or Mr Mortimer should be criticised in any way for their responses to the information they received.

34. In 2006, Mark Lawson saw Savile assault C23, who was working on *Front Row*. Savile was being interviewed for that programme after taking part in the very last *Top of the Pops* programme. Afterwards, Mr Lawson and C23 mentioned that Savile had behaved in a lecherous way to John Goudie, the Editor of *Front Row*, although not as a formal complaint. In any event, C23 did not wish to make a complaint; she regarded the incident as unpleasant but thought that it was really a case of an old man acting in a clumsy, outdated and inappropriate manner. Savile was almost 80 at the time. In the circumstances, I think that both Mr Lawson and Mr Goudie acted entirely reasonably and I do not criticise either of them in any way for the fact that this incident was not taken any further.

35. There were a number of incidents which I have described at paragraph 5.366 of my Report where members of staff saw or became aware of strange or unusual behaviour by Savile. I have in mind such people as Richard Broke, Bob Langley, Jonathan Bennett, A9, Ann Mann and David Nicolson. These were not reported upwards to anyone senior, which I think was understandable as none of the incidents involved actual sexual misconduct.

36. Finally, as mentioned above at paragraphs 15-17, Mr Hampton reported Savile disappearing with a young girl from the *Top of the Pops* studio on two separate occasions, respectively to the show’s presenter and to Mr Nash (the producer of that night’s show). Neither of those incidents involved actual sexual misconduct. They
were examples of unusual behaviour which might be of concern. I therefore could not conclude that either the presenter or the producer was aware of inappropriate sexual conduct by Savile.

37. My conclusion is that a number of BBC staff were aware of specific complaints about Savile’s conduct and in two cases were aware of his sexual interest in teenage girls, some of whom might have been underage. All of these people ought to have reported their awareness to their line managers or to someone in a more senior position. None of them did so. The result is that I must conclude that there is no evidence that any senior member of staff (of Head of Department status or above) was aware of Savile’s conduct. It follows that I have found no evidence that the BBC as a corporate body was aware of Savile’s conduct.

38. I understand that my conclusion on this issue may prompt comment based, perhaps, on previous media reports that the BBC “knew” about Savile. I have explained, in Chapter 8, why I conclude that, for various reasons, some of those media reports were misleading. In summary, my conclusion is that certain junior and middle-ranking individuals were aware of Savile’s inappropriate sexual conduct in connection with his work for the BBC. However, I have found no evidence that the BBC, as a body corporate, was aware of Savile’s inappropriate sexual conduct in connection with his work for the BBC.

To what extent ought BBC personnel to have been aware of inappropriate sexual conduct by Savile in connection with his work for the BBC?

39. I interpret this question as asking me to what extent awareness of inappropriate sexual conduct by Savile in connection with his work for the BBC should have come to the attention of more senior BBC personnel thus providing an opportunity for that conduct to be addressed. In short, were there failings in the BBC possibly of a
cultural nature which prevented people with sufficient seniority to take action ever being alerted to the existence of a problem?

40. I have already enumerated the occasions on which a junior or middle-ranking member of BBC staff who became aware of a complaint or concern failed to report it upwards to a level where action could be taken. So the short answer to the question is that, yes, there were occasions when senior BBC staff did not find out about things which they ought to have found out about. No senior manager ever found out about any specific complaint relating to Savile’s inappropriate sexual conduct in connection with his work for the BBC. If any or all of those members of staff had reported what they knew upwards to a more senior level, where action could have been taken, it is possible that Savile would have been exposed.

41. Why was it that they did not report what they knew upwards? In most of those cases I have not been able find out why; I have not been able to identify or question them. The exceptions are Ted Beston (I think that he would never have thought of passing on what he knew) and Canon Semper who was concerned but did not report his concerns because he did not then regard the conduct of which he was aware as being as serious as he now knows it is. Also, he thought (wrongly) that his managers were also aware of Savile’s conduct and that it was not up to him to report it.

42. In addition, I have the impression that the reason why some of the people who were aware did not report upwards what they had learned was that they personally thought that such conduct was not seriously wrong and that people who complained were making a fuss. Examples are the two men, one with the clipboard and one with earphones, on *Top of the Pops* (see paragraphs 12 and 13 above). Those attitudes were not unknown in British society in the late 1960s and 1970s. It appears that they were not uncommon in
the BBC, although I am not for a moment saying that they were universally held there.

43. My conclusion is, however, that in addition to the personal views of some individuals who thought that sexual conduct (of the kind complained of say by B8 and C16) was not serious, there were cultural factors at work within the BBC which militated against the reporting upwards of sexual complaints or concerns, particularly when they related to a member of the Talent such as Savile. I will come to those cultural factors in a moment but I wish first to deal with the question of rumours and what should be done about them. I also wish to discuss a specific example of a lost opportunity to discover things about Savile which could and would have been discovered if there had been greater concern than there was about child protection and greater diligence in pursuing worrying rumours.

44. As I recorded in the main body of my Report, quite a number of people in the BBC (and in the music industry and in Fleet Street) heard rumours about Savile. In the main, these were rumours about his interest in teenage girls. Of course they were not heard by everyone in the BBC. Ought the people who did hear them to have reported what they had heard to someone in authority? It is clear that, in general, this did not happen. Perhaps the main reason for this was that the people who heard a rumour often assumed that, if they had heard it, so had everyone else. So, it was not up to them to take any action; it was a matter for someone more senior. I do not find those attitudes surprising and do not consider that they warrant criticism. The trouble was that the more senior people would not necessarily know of the rumours; as one would expect, more senior people do not seem to have had the same exposure to gossip and rumour as those in less senior positions. The BBC is a hierarchical organisation and, as a general rule, I think people tended to socialise with colleagues at their own level in the hierarchy. In any event, it is difficult to know what action ought
to be taken in respect of a man about whom one hears rumours of inappropriate or even unlawful conduct. One cannot report rumours to the police; nor can one take disciplinary action as an employer. One might well say that, if a disturbing rumour comes to the ears of a senior manager, it should be investigated. But one must also bear in mind that, where the rumour relates to someone with the reputation of being a great benefactor, tireless fundraiser and a friend of the great and the good, there will be an understandable tendency to discount the rumour as being untrue.

45. There was one occasion of which I know when a senior manager heard disturbing rumours about Savile. In 1973, Douglas Muggeridge, the Controller of Radio 1 and 2 heard rumours about Savile’s sexual impropriety. He set in train two lines of inquiry: see paragraphs 11.14 onwards and 11.34 onwards in the Report. The first line of enquiry led to a meeting between Savile, Derek Chinnery, then Head of Programmes for Radio 1, and Doreen Davies, an executive producer. Savile was asked whether there was any truth in the rumours; he said there was not and it appears that Mr Chinnery and Ms Davies believed him. The second line entailed enquiries with the press through Rodney Collins, a BBC Radio publicity officer. He learned that the press had heard rumours too but had no hard evidence. It appears that Mr Muggeridge was reassured and no further enquiries were made.

46. I have not been able to interview Mr Muggeridge who died many years ago. However, it appears to me that the main concern which prompted his enquiries was the risk of damage to the BBC’s reputation, rather than the welfare of any girls who might be sexually involved with Savile. It seems likely that, as a result of his enquiries, he believed the rumours to be untrue. Even so, I am surprised that he should have closed the book quite as completely as he appears to have done. I would have expected him to have some lingering anxiety about the Savile rumours and their potential
for damage to the BBC’s reputation. As a prudent manager, I would have expected him to retain some concerns, share them with other senior colleagues within the BBC and keep a watching eye and a listening ear on Savile within BBC Radio. This could have been done through members of his staff.

47. In my view, had discreet enquiries of BBC Radio staff been made, a number would have come forward with information which would at least have given significant cause for concern about Savile. In particular, if enquiries had been made of Canon Colin Semper and Canon David Winter, both of whom worked as co-producers on Speakeasy in the Religious Broadcasting Department, concerns about Savile would, I think, have been expressed. Without having had the opportunity to speak to Mr Muggeridge, I do not criticise him personally for his approach. But it is unfortunate that he did not retain his concerns and share them because, had he done so and particularly if those concerns had been passed to television, it seems likely that information would have come to light which would have taken the level of concern to the point where the BBC would have had to consider dispensing with Savile’s services.

Did the culture and practices within the BBC during the years of Savile’s employment enable Savile’s inappropriate sexual conduct to continue unchecked?

48. I will deal first with those cultural and practical issues which, in my view, allowed inappropriate sexual behaviour to continue unchecked and then will deal separately with those issues which related specifically to the abuse of young people under the age of consent.

The Culture of Not Complaining

49. First and most important there was, during the period covered by the Savile investigation, a culture within the BBC which made it
difficult to complain or to say anything to management which might 'rock the boat'. There were several facets to this culture.

50. One was that complaining was often seen as being damaging to the interests of the complainant. While it is important to say that the sense of insecurity which inhibits staff from whistle-blowing is a widespread, longstanding and intractable problem, there was clear evidence specifically relating to the BBC. There was evidence that people who were contemplating making a complaint decided or were persuaded not to do so because it would damage their careers. I was particularly saddened by the fact that a few witnesses from the BBC who gave evidence to the Review asked for an assurance that their names would not be published in my Report before they were willing to say anything even mildly critical of the BBC. The reason appeared to be that they feared some form of reprisal.

51. I was told that an atmosphere of fear still exists today in the BBC possibly because obtaining work in the BBC is highly competitive and many people no longer have the security of an employment contract. My concern in this regard was shared by the Report of the BBC's Respect At Work Review (published in May 2013) which examined the culture and practices of the BBC in recent years. That report mentioned fear of reprisal, fear of losing your job, fear of being known as a troublemaker and fear of not being promoted as reasons why complaints might not be made. Some members of staff tried to report complaints or raise concerns of a sexual nature through the BBC's Personnel department, as it was then known. These reports did not relate to Savile. The evidence was that such reports were often not properly dealt with during the 1970s, 1980s and even in the 1990s. Sometimes, the complainant was told that it was not in her best interests to pursue the complaint. Sometimes it was implied that the complainant's own attitude was the problem. I have not been asked to investigate the Human Resources
Department since the Savile years, but I do note that the BBC’s *Respect at Work Review* stated that there was a common perception that the Human Resources department “worked for management” and did not provide support for employees who wanted to make a complaint or raise a concern. Unfortunately, that finding resonates with my findings in relation to the Savile period.

52. A further aspect to the culture of not complaining was the strong sense of loyalty that BBC staff felt towards the programme on which they were working. There was a sense of pride in the programme, a strong desire that it should succeed, a strong sense of competitiveness with other programmes and a strong disincentive to do anything which might compromise that success.

53. The strong sense of loyalty to a programme could hinder the sharing of information or concerns. For example, as I explain at paragraph 10.98 of my Report, in the 1980s, there grew up in the production team on *Jim’ll Fix It* a general sense of unease about Savile in relation to sexual matters. It is not clear if that was raised even with the show’s producer, let alone with anyone more senior.

*The Culture of Not Complaining about the Talent*

54. As I have said, there was a culture of not complaining about anything. The culture of not complaining about a member of the Talent was even stronger. Members of the Talent, such as Savile, were to a real degree, protected from complaint. The first reason for this is because of a deference or even adulation which was, and still can be, accorded to celebrity in our society. The second reason was because of the attitude within the BBC towards the Talent. The evidence I heard suggested that the Talent was treated with kid gloves and rarely challenged. An example of this is the attitude of C51’s supervisor when he was told that Savile had sexually assaulted C51 (see paragraphs 5.254-5.255 of my Report). His immediate reply was “*Keep your mouth shut, he is a VIP*”. 
55. Peter Scott-Morgan (who undertook consultancy work for the BBC in 2003, some years after Savile had stopped working regularly for the BBC) used an expression which I think encapsulated the general attitude towards the Talent. He said that they were “more valuable than the values”. By this he meant that a member of the Talent could be so influential at the BBC or so important to the success of a programme that he or she could get away with conduct which flew in the face of the values of the BBC. Managers would not challenge members of the Talent. There was a feeling of reverence for them and a fear that, if a star were crossed, he or she might leave the BBC. Alan Hart, who became Controller of BBC One in 1981, said that he was “quite sure that [the BBC] would be prepared to overlook certain things for fear of losing talent”.

The Lack of Any Suitable Route for the Making of Complaints

56. The management structure of the BBC did not facilitate the making of complaints or the raising of concerns. The BBC was and is hierarchical. Management practice in the BBC entailed an expectation that managers (and others) who needed advice or a decision would refer the issue upwards to their immediate line manager and not by any other route. I do not criticise the BBC for its pyramidal structure, but it appears that many members of staff felt that the hierarchy was over-respectful and inhibited the free exchange of views. This could cause reluctance to take a complaint or concern to the next level in the hierarchy, usually the immediate line manager. This reluctance might arise for several reasons, some of which I have already mentioned.

57. Many members of staff felt that complaining or raising any concern through a line manager was not a suitable means of complaining, particularly in relation to sexual harassment. As a result, a number felt that there was “no clear channel” for reporting inappropriate behaviour. Also some staff said that they would be reluctant to raise a concern, say for example about a member of the Talent,
with their line manager because they would assume that those more senior to them would know about it and they did not want to be seen to be questioning those above them in the hierarchy.

58. From the findings of the *Respect at Work Review*, it seemed that little had changed in the culture of not complaining since the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. However, the more recent report of GoodCorporation and information which the BBC has recently provided to the Review suggests that changes in this culture are now being made. The GoodCorporation report says that the BBC has put in place a whistleblowing policy that provides a channel for anyone inside the Corporation to raise a serious concern, which ensures that it will be investigated impartially and will be brought to the attention of senior management. According to GoodCorporation, there is now a clear message from senior management encouraging employees to raise their concerns. The large majority of those interviewed had said that they would feel confident to do so.

59. GoodCorporation also considered that the complaint investigation process was carried out in a genuinely impartial way and was properly independent of day to day management. The identity of the complainant was properly kept confidential. An audit of individuals who had raised complaints or concerns through the new official whistleblowing channel revealed no cases where the complainant had suffered a detriment. The problem of giving special treatment to the Talent had been recognised and was being addressed. However, the report disclosed that there was quite widespread ignorance among staff about the new arrangements with the result that some concerns were still being raised with line managers. Not all had satisfactory outcomes. In addition, GoodCorporation was not satisfied that the new arrangements had been properly extended to temporary staff and contractors. In short, although, according to GoodCorporation, much progress has
been made and there is evidence of genuine commitment by the BBC, there remains work to be done.

The Culture of Separation and the Lack of Cross-dissemination about Concerns

60. A further reason why information was not reported upwards as it should have been was that, at the relevant time, there was a clear separation between various parts of the BBC, including between Television and Radio. As one witness told me, BBC Radio and Television had “two completely separate cultures” and “two completely separate groups of people” and it was a case of “never the twain shall meet”. This separation led to what was described as “the silo mentality”. When Lord Birt arrived at the BBC in 1987, he found it to be “highly baronial” and that some parts of television were “anarchical”. Dame Esther Rantzen described the BBC as “a set of private armies” and added that “they don’t necessarily like each other.” When Greg Dyke came to the BBC as Director-General in 2000, he put in place an initiative called “One BBC” which was an attempt to make the BBC pull together – and, as he put it to me, “to stop the people in Newsnight thinking the people in Panorama were the enemy and vice versa”. A number of witnesses expressed regret that when Mr Dyke left his post in 2004, his attempts to bring about change were truncated.

61. This sense of separation could mean that a concern which arose in one part of the BBC would not be transmitted to or discussed with another part. For example, in 1973, Douglas Muggeridge does not appear to have shared his concern about Savile with anyone in Television. I accept that, if an issue was considered by the Board of Management, it would be known of by senior management across the BBC. For example, when concerns arose about possible misconduct at Top of the Pops, there was some discussion at a meeting of the Board of Management. Soon afterwards, there was discussion about this kind of issue at the Management Director
Radio’s weekly meetings. But if an issue was not raised at such a meeting, its chances of going across the BBC were slight.

62. At a lower level, there could be a reluctance to discuss a problem which arose in one department with personnel in another. This seems to have been attributable to the sense of competitiveness which prevailed between programme making departments.

63. Even within the same programme, there could be difficulties of communication in relation to complaints. Staff working on a programme would not necessarily have the same line manager. Staff working on the production team would be part of a line of management which ran through the producer, maybe to an executive producer and from there to the head of department. Other staff would have a different management line – for example, the floor manager would not report to the programme producer but to his or her own line manager in the Studio Management Department. That was because the provision of floor management was a central service provided to a programme. Cameramen, sound engineers and audience supervisors had similar separate management structures. This separation seems to me to have the potential for preventing anyone in management from seeing the bigger picture.

The Macho Culture

64. Another reason why complaints or concerns of a sexual nature might not have been passed up the BBC as they should have been related to the ‘macho culture’ which some witnesses said was present in some (but not all) departments of the BBC. Particular complaint was made about the behaviour and attitudes of technical staff (who were almost entirely male) and of management in Radio 1 and Television’s Light Entertainment Department, where there very few women in senior positions. I have the impression that sexual harassment was more common in the Light Entertainment Department and BBC Radio 1 (the areas where Savile worked)
than in many other parts of the BBC. Women found it difficult to report sexual harassment. Generally, the attitude of the male managers was thought to be unsympathetic and, of course, there were very few female managers. I was told that management in the programme-making departments usually had a technical background. No doubt that background had its advantages when it came to understanding the business of making programmes. I doubt, however, that such a pool necessarily provided the best management material. It does not appear that there was any management training in respect of such matters as diversity, dealing with complaints or in respect of sexual harassment generally. I accept that it was not common in industry generally for management training to be offered on such topics until the 1990s.

*Lack of a Coordinated Approach to the Investigation of Complaints or Concerns*

65. One of the cultural or practical weaknesses which may well have contributed to a failure to check Savile’s sexual misconduct was the BBC’s method of investigation. Although the BBC had an Investigations Department, which may have been capable of conducting a thorough investigation, not all investigations were referred to that department. Indeed, I heard of several which were dealt with within the department in which they arose. Where the concern was of a sexual nature, the practice appears to have been merely to ask the person accused whether the allegation was true and, if it was denied, to accept the denial and say that nothing more could be done. There was no attempt to collect evidence which might support the complaint or even to provide general background to it. I cite as examples of this, the way in which the Light Entertainment Department investigated a sexual misconduct allegation against a celebrity in 1971 (see paragraph 9.50 onwards) and the way in which Derek Chinnery investigated rumours about Savile which concerned Mr Muggeridge in 1973 (from paragraph 11.14 of my Report). A further example may be found in the way in
which the BBC investigated allegations against Harry Goodwin, the
stills photographer on Top of the Pops (from paragraph 9.45 of my
Report).

Cultural Factors Relating to Underage Victims

66. Before considering cultural and practical issues within the BBC of
specific relevance to the abuse of those under the age of consent, I
should make it clear that I do not criticise the BBC for the fact that,
during the period between the 1960s and the 1990s, child
protection was very low on its radar, no clear policies or procedures
existed and such matters were generally not discussed. The
position in the BBC simply reflected the situation in many if not
most organisations at that time. I accept that there is evidence that
the BBC of today takes child protection very seriously. The report
of GoodCorporation shows how much has changed, although some
work remains to be done.

67. In one respect, the BBC of the 1980s was ahead of the times. It
played an important role in the development of the public
awareness of child abuse in the mid-1980s through the programme
Childwatch which was devised and presented by Dame Esther
Rantzen. At the time, the initial focus was on the recognition of
abuse in the home and it was not until later that consideration was
given to the possibility that there could be child abuse risks even
within the BBC itself. Save for one exceptional factor which I
address below, it is not surprising that senior managers in the BBC
during the relevant period never applied their minds to the
possibility that a disc jockey presenter might use his celebrity and
position at the BBC to attract and groom those under the age of
consent for sex. To modern ears, this might sound uncaring, but I
do not think that it is surprising.

68. The exceptional factor relates to the events of 1969 and 1971 when
the BBC received a number of wake-up calls about the risks to
which teenage girls were exposed when attending Top of the Pops.
In Chapter 9 I have described the circumstances which provided these wake-up calls. For example, the *News of the World* made allegations about the taking of pornographic pictures of young girls and the picking-up of girls under 16 by male members of staff on the programme. At the same time, the BBC was facing separate allegations that various BBC producers and other staff had received money, gifts and services (including sexual services) in return for playing particular records, thereby assisting their entry into and ascent up the charts.

69. The BBC’s investigations into these different allegations showed, in my view, where its real concern lay; it lay with the allegations of corruption. The BBC’s investigations into the possibility that young girls attending *Top of the Pops* were at risk of moral danger did not evince any real concern for the welfare of the young audience. The impression I have is that the BBC regarded these girls as something of a nuisance. Board of Management minutes for the relevant time reveal a limited focus on these issues. It appears that the BBC was content with the decision to raise the admission age from 15 to 16. That measure did little if anything to tackle the gravamen of the concerns raised, particularly as the BBC well knew that it was virtually impossible to police the age limit. In any event, even if the audience was over 16, it does not seem to me to be satisfactory for the BBC to permit unsupervised contact between teenagers and older men in the testosterone laden atmosphere that prevailed in the *Top of the Pops* studio.

70. By comparison, the BBC prompted a much more in-depth investigation into corruption allegations than into the allegations relating to *Top of the Pops*. I think that, for the BBC, allegations of bribery, corruption and rigging of popular music were much more serious than allegations that they were failing in their duties of child protection.
71. A similar attitude existed in Radio 1. As I explain from paragraph 11.2 onwards of my Report, the issues raised on Top of the Pops were also considered within Radio 1 and it is clear, in particular from the minutes of a meeting held in 1971 and chaired by the Managing Director (Radio), that the management of Radio 1 was aware of the dangers of bringing together disc jockeys and young girls in circumstances in which assignations of a sexual nature might be made. Although the possibility that disc jockeys might abuse their position is recognised, the minutes I have seen demonstrate what, to my mind, is a most unfortunate attitude towards the young girls: they are regarded as “unbalanced” and not as merely young and in need of protection.

72. In summary, while I do not criticise the BBC for a lack of general focus in the organisation on the well-being and protection of children at the relevant time, I do criticise its response and attitude to such issues when they arose. The BBC appears to have been much more concerned about its reputation and the possibility of adverse comment in the media than in actually focussing on the need to protect vulnerable young audiences.

My Recommendations

73. It is clear from the Reports of the Savile and Hall investigations that, over a long period of time, both men engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct in connection with their work for the BBC and took advantage of their association with the BBC to further their contacts with young people for sexual purposes. Much has been written publicly about the BBC and its awareness of what Savile and Hall were doing. Some of what has been written has been ill-informed and wrong; some of it has been accurate. I hope that my Report and Dame Linda Dobbs’s Report will be accepted as authoritative accounts of the activities of both men in connection with their work for the BBC. The delivery of these Reports presents an opportunity for the BBC to take steps to ensure that history cannot repeat itself.
74. The events which Dame Linda and I have described took place many years ago. However, the BBC must resist the temptation to treat what happened then as being of limited relevance to today. It clearly is not and I shall seek to explain the ways in which our findings are important to today’s BBC.

75. Primary responsibility for the commission of acts of inappropriate sexual conduct in connection with their work for the BBC lies with Savile and Hall. However, as Dame Linda and I have explained, there are a number of cultural factors and systems failures which were the responsibility of the BBC and which, in our view, contributed to the failure to detect this misconduct and consequently contributed to its continuance. Had those factors and failures not existed or had they been addressed and resolved, it is possible (but not certain) that the misconduct of either or both men would not have happened or would have been curtailed. In considering the lessons to be learned by the BBC from Savile and Hall, I therefore focus on those factors and failures which, if addressed, might have prevented or curtailed their activities.

76. Before I consider specific points, I wish to make some general observations. Savile and Hall make very sorry reading for the BBC. Although the situation relating to Hall in Manchester is in some important respects different from the situation affecting Savile in London, there are some common factors. The main difference between Dame Linda’s and my conclusions is that Dame Linda has made specific findings that members of management in Manchester were aware of Hall’s activities whereas I have found no evidence that senior individuals in London were aware of Savile’s.

77. Dame Linda found that Mr Colley (Regional Television Manager, North West) was aware (without direct personal knowledge) of Hall’s past inappropriate sexual conduct on BBC premises and, indeed, that he expressly warned Hall against similar conduct in the future. She also found that, because he had a specific reason to
ensure that a watch was kept on Hall, Mr Colley ought to have been aware of what Hall later did on BBC premises. Dame Linda also found that Mr German (News Editor, North West) was most probably aware or should have been aware. There was no precise equivalent to Mr Colley or Mr German in London; there were no senior individuals who knew about Savile’s interest in sex in the way that Mr Colley and Mr German knew about Hall’s. It seems to me that that is probably because there were no senior individuals in London who had day-to-day contact with Savile as Mr Colley and Mr German (who were part of a very much smaller centrally based Manchester management team) did with Hall. My criticisms of senior management in London relate to their failure to be more concerned about Savile’s reputation and to have realised that he was not suitable for the work he was doing for the BBC.

78. More important for present purposes is that both Dame Linda and I have identified some serious failings in the BBC’s culture and its systems of communication, management and investigation. We have also identified a number of cultural factors which militated against the discovery of sexual misconduct or inappropriate sexual conduct which were not specific to the BBC but were general in society.

79. I will deal first with the factors which were general in society during the material period. They were, first, a failure to see sexual abuse of the young as a significant major problem. Regrettably, as a society, we are still discovering the extent to which the young can be vulnerable to grooming and sexual exploitation. Consequent upon the failure to understand the extent of the problem of sexual abuse of the young was a common sense of disbelief when such allegations were made. As a result, when complaints were made to persons in authority, too often the complaints were disbelieved, disregarded or covered up. Children were not protected as they should have been.
Second, in addition to the failure to recognise the abuse of young children, there was also a failure in society to recognise the need to protect young people around the age of consent from exploitation by older men. Society had had to accept that girls of 15 sometimes would have intercourse and could not effectively be stopped but it seems that, at least in some sectors of society, that was taken to mean that the age of consent was not important; if the girl was willing, the fact that she was under the age at which she could consent was not of great importance. Moreover, there seems to have been a sense that, once a girl had reached the age of 16, anything went. There was a failure to recognise the seriousness of the harm which could be done to young people who might (albeit lawfully and willingly) be drawn into casual sexual contact with older men who were abusing the power given to them by their age or position. These factors, which were general in society, were not the responsibility of the BBC. They are important because they form the background to what happened. The people within the BBC who had responsibility for dealing with concerns about sexual misconduct were living within and must have been affected by those cultural features of our society.

Further, there were also a number of employment or business practices and internal cultural failings in relation to which I am critical of the BBC. I have to acknowledge the fact that, even in relation to these failings, the point can legitimately be made that they were, at the time, probably common throughout business, industry and the professions. For example, during the relevant years, the BBC was a place of sexual discrimination and sexual harassment and there was a failure on the part of management to take such problems seriously. The BBC was far from the only place where such problems occurred. However, as I say above, these are issues on which I do criticise the BBC. Had these failures been addressed at the time, it is possible that, at best, Savile would not have behaved as he did or, at least, his activities would have been
curtailed. In this part of my Report, I do not need to do more than
to list these factors, although I will, in each case, identify where the
issue is dealt with in more detail in my Report. The failings are:-

- The lack of an effective complaints process
  (paragraphs 2.96 to 2.108 of my Report);

- The need for stronger lateral relationships
  across the BBC encouraging the sharing of
  information (paragraphs 2.42 to 2.56 of my
  Report);

- The lack of an effective investigations process
  (for example, paragraphs 9.61 to 9.65 and
  9.74-9.75 of my Report);

- The need for stronger audience controls and
  protection (for example, paragraphs 9.12-9.14
  and 9.23 (in relation to Top of the Pops) and
  10.26-10.28 (in relation to Jim’l Fix It); and

- The need for an effective human resources
  department providing proper support to
  employees as well as the employer
  (paragraphs 2.99 to 2.108 and 2.126 of my
  Report).

82. In the ordinary course of events, after Dame Linda and I had
reached our conclusions about the unlawful and inappropriate
conduct which had occurred and about why those things had not
been discovered earlier, I would have expected to make detailed
recommendations about the steps that needed to be taken to
ensure that any repetition could be avoided in future. However, in
this case, it does not seem to me to be sensible or practicable to
attempt to do so. The events and shortcomings I have described occurred many years ago. They occurred against a particular social background. Much has changed since then. First, social attitudes have changed greatly. For example, there is universal awareness of the duty of any organisation involved with young people to protect them from harm. Second, based upon my reading of the report of GoodCorporation and the Respect at Work Review, the BBC has changed and its attitudes have changed. Its procedures have developed. An obvious example of change is that the BBC now has a satisfactory child protection policy. Employment practices have also changed. For example, the BBC, like all large employers, has grievance procedures, whistle-blowing policies and mechanisms by which complaints and concerns can be raised. It seems reasonable for me to assume that many things have changed within the BBC since the period about which I have written.

83. As a result, I propose to make one overarching recommendation. It seems to me that the BBC needs to demonstrate to the public that it has taken the current criticisms seriously and has made, or is making, such changes as are necessary and appropriate to ensure that these terrible events cannot occur again. By current criticisms I mean those made in the Savile and Hall Reports and the Report of the Respect at Work Review. My recommendation is that within, say six months of this report, the BBC should set out its official response to all the reports and should explain what its current rules, policies and procedures are in respect of each of the areas which have been open to criticism and demonstrate that these apply current best practice.

84. Having appropriate policies is only part of the answer. In addition to publishing and explaining its policies, the BBC should, in my view, commission an independent audit of the operation of those rules, policies and procedures. It should set out the timeframe in which
each of these areas will be subject to audit, how the audit will be undertaken and should confirm that the results of each audit will be made public. Further, it should undertake now to make any changes to procedures recommended by those audits to ensure that it maintains best practice in these extremely important areas.

85. For the avoidance of doubt, the issues which should be dealt with in this way include the protection of children and young people, complaints and whistle-blowing procedures and the procedures for investigating complaints whether internal or external. Examining these issues will also entail close examination of the operation of the Human Resources function. In addition, a commitment from the very top of the organisation to the principles of good practice in all these areas must be demonstrated.

86. In addition to undertaking to audit its practices in respect of these specific issues, I consider that the BBC ought to undergo a period of self-examination in respect of a number of other issues. These are matters to which I have drawn attention which I think have contributed to the BBC’s failure to detect Savile and Hall but which I cannot say must be changed in any particular ways. These matters must be carefully considered at a high level.

87. These issues are, first, the lack of cohesion within the BBC. I have described the poor lateral communications between parts of the BBC, the sense of superiority of one part over another and the existence of competing fiefdoms. I acknowledge that competition may stimulate artistic excellence but my impression is that, at the levels I heard of, it is counterproductive. Greg Dyke recognised these problems and tried to tackle them under his “One BBC” project. The evidence I heard was that, after he left in 2004, the project was abandoned. I think that it or something like it should be reconsidered. My own view is that there should be commitment, at the highest level, to the principle that, subject to the needs of
journalistic independence, different departments should work together and share information.

88. Second, the hierarchical nature of management structure should be re-examined. I think that the aim must be a culture in which management is respected but not feared. I was particularly disturbed by the evidence heard by both the Respect at Work Review and me about the extent to which staff were and still are afraid to raise complaints or concerns for fear of losing their jobs or the opportunity for promotion or, for freelancers, the fear of not being used again. The commitment of managers to these principles should be tested through appraisal and feedback processes.

89. Third, I think the BBC should examine its attitudes towards ‘the Talent’. I have reported that the BBC appeared, at least in the past, to be tolerant of inappropriate conduct by the stars because they were more valuable to the BBC than the BBC’s own values. The BBC should leave members of the Talent in no doubt as to the standards of behaviour expected of them. I was also concerned that the attitude of some managers appeared to be that they would turn a blind eye to inappropriate conduct unless there was adverse comment in the press or from the public. I think that the BBC ought always to make its own mind up about what it should do in the light of its own values.

A Final Word

90. I wish to conclude with three general remarks. The first relates to the BBC; the other two to our society at large.

91. This Report makes sorry reading for the BBC. Both Dame Linda and I have found disturbing things and have not hesitated to expose them. We have also, however, found positive things: the BBC has always been a place of quality and dedication – a place where people were proud and happy to work and were even prepared to
accept unpleasantness because it was so important to them to work for one of the world’s leading and most respected media organisations. If the BBC can genuinely learn from this desperate experience, it should be able to face the future with confidence.

92. One of the questions which I have been asked is whether it is possible that a predatory child abuser could be lurking in the BBC even today. My answer is that I do not think there is any organisation that can be completely confident that it does not harbour a child abuser. It must be recognised that child sex abusers can be highly intelligent, articulate and charismatic but manipulative people. Stuart Hall is an example. Savile too was intelligent, charismatic and extremely manipulative, even if not always very articulate. Any organisation could be duped by such an individual. There is an additional factor for an organisation which employs celebrities, such as the BBC. The power of celebrity and the trust we accord it, which show no real sign of diminishing in our society, make detection of a celebrity abuser even more difficult. Until a complaint is made, such people are likely to enjoy the confidence and approval of all those around them.

93. As a society we must do everything we can to ensure that young victims have the confidence to complain at the time (or soon after) they are abused and the confidence to face the criminal justice system. It is clear that the revelations about Savile and Hall have encouraged people, now adult, who have been abused in the past to come forward to give their accounts. We need now to ensure that that message is passed to the younger generation. We need them to complain straightaway if they are abused before the abuser has the chance to abuse again and again. We need also to ensure that the criminal justice system treats them appropriately so that the fear of giving evidence will not deter them.